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VOLLME HI JANuARY, 1957 NUMBER 1
THE DEMURRER - AT COMMON LAW, UNDER
MODERN CODES, PRACTICE ACTS, AND
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE"
ALISON REPPY
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
IN THE Sixteenth Century Sir Thomas Smith, in his discourse on
the Commonwealth of England, referred to the Demurrer as a device
for raising an issue of law, and stated that the mode of proceeding
thereunder is contrary to the civil law, where the fact is first deter-
mined, after, which the law is applied The Demurrer, then, was a pro-
cedural weapon without counterpart in the Romanized systems of
procedure found on the Continent.
According to Professor Millar, the blending of the Germanic and
Romano-Canonical institutions,3 in the Twelfth and Thirteenth cen-
turies, gave form to the procedural development of the common law.
Among other conceptions contributed by the Germanic law, which was
preponderant in its effect, was the fundamental idea which still under-
lies the Demurrer, to wit, that it is a procedural device for "testing the
legal relevancy of allegation, at the instance of the opposing party,
AISON REPPY is Dean and Professor of Law at New York Law School.
This article will form a chapter in a book on Common-Law Pleading-The Funda-
mental Basis of Modem Procedure, to be published by West Publishing Company, St.
Paul, Minnesota, which Company has very kindly permitted the use of certain ma-
terials in Martin, Civil Procedure at Common Law (St. Paul 1903) and Shipman,
Handbodk on Common Law Pleading (Edited by Ballantine, St. Paul 1923), for
which acknowledgment in general is here made. Specific credit will also appear at the
appropriate points in the notes.
[Ed. Note: This paper will be printed in several installments, of which this is the
first.]
1 In general, on the demurrer at Cqmmon Law, Under Modem Codes and Practice
Acts, and Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see:
Treatises: R. G., DocTamE or Dan murm; SEa=Gqo FORTH A VARIETY or DE-
2uvlRms, nT ALL SORTS OF AcnioNs; AND IN ALL SEVERAL PARTS OF PLADING, (Lon-
don 1706); WycH-, A TREATISE ON =" PRACTICE OF '=n Suppdz CouRT oF JumIC-
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TURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YoRi IN Civm ACTiONS, c. XV, Of Demurrers, 173 (New
York 1794); HERTELL, 1HE DEmuRRE; OR PROOFS Or ERROR IN THE DECISION OF THE
SupwRzn COURT OF NEW YoPx, IN REQUIRING FAITH IN A PARTICULAR DoCTRINE IN A
WINESss, (New York 1828); MAsEL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
DEmuREmms TO PLEADINGS AuD EVIDENCE, oF BILLS OF EXCEPnONS; WAGER OF LAw;
IssuE AND TRI By THE RECORD, (London 1824); STEPH , A TREATISE ON THE PRiN-
CIPLES OF PLEADING IN Civm ACTIONS, (London 1828); 1 CmTnI, TREATISE ON THE
FoRms OF AcTIoN AND ON PLEADING, C. I, Demurrers, 25a (3d Am. from 2d London
ed. 1839); TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OV Ki0's BENCH, c. XXXVII, De-
murrers, 160 (2d Am. ed., New York 1807); SHnmANm, HANDBOOx OF COMMON-LAW
PLEADING, c. XII, Demurrer, Aider and Amendment, § 146, 277 (3d ed. by Ballantine, St.
Paul 1923); PERRY, CoxMoN-LAw PLExDINo, c. 9, Of Demurrers, 323 (Boston 1897);
MARTn, CIVm PROCEDURE AT CoMMoN LAW, Demurrers, Art. H, § 1, 194 (St. Paul
1905) ; GoURD, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCPLES OF PLEADING IN CiviL ACTIONS, C. V,
Of Demurrers, 570 (6th ed. by Will, Albany 1909); GARDINER, LAws RELATING TO Dz-
muRRERs, 7 INSTRUCTOR GRENAR I (London 1914); SCOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRo-
cmuu - r ACTIONS OF LAW, c. V, Amendment and Jeofails, 143 (New York 1922);
CrImx, HAm oox OF TH LAW OF CODE PLEADING, c. 8, Demurrers and Motions (2d
ed., St. Paul 1947).
Articles: Abbott, To Demur or Not to Demur, 44 AID. L. J. 453 (1891); Loomis,
The Effect of a Decree Sustaining a Demurrer to a Complaint, 9 YALE L. J. 387 (1900) ;
Edgerton, The Consolidation of Preliminary Motions and Demurrers in Connecticut,
22 YALE L. J. 302 (1913); Millar, Retroactive Operation of the Demurrer, 10 ILL. L.
REv. 417 (1916); Cook, Abolition of Equitable Demurrer, 10 IowA L. REv. 193 (1925);
Smith, Some Problems in Connection with Motions, 25 CoL. L. REV. 752 (1925);
Atkinson, Allegations of Time in Pleading, 35 YALE L. J. 487 (1926); Atkinson, Some
Procedural Aspects of the Statute of Limitations, 27 COL. L. REv. 157 (1927); Atkin-
son, Pleading the Statute of Limitations, 35 YALE L. J. 914 (1927); Clark & Yerion,
Aider and Amendment, 12 AMUw. L. REv. 97, 125 (1928); Wellman, Demurrer to
Parts of Complaint, 7 IND. L. J. 165 (1931); Arnold, Motions to Make Certain and to
Resolve Conclusions, 7 IND. L. J. 77, 82-83 (1931); Carlin, Function of a Demurrer
Under the Revised Code, 41 W. VA. L. REV. 313 (1935); Millar, The Fortunes of the
Demurrer, 31 ILL. L. REv. 429 (1936); Eagleton, Two Fundamentals for Federal
Pleading Reform, 3 U. OF Cr. L. REv. 376, 392-401 (1936); Pike, Objections to
Pleadings Under the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 47 YALE L. J. 50 (1937);
Rotwein, Pleading and Practice Under the New Federal Rules-A Survey and Com-
parison, 8 BRooxLYN L. REv. 188 (1938); Stayton, Scope and Function of the New
Federal Rules and Texas Rules, 20 TExAS L. REv. 16, 24 (1941); Loth, Pleadings and
Motions, 20 IOWA L. REv. 23 (1943); Brown, Some Problems Concerning Motiom
Under Federal Rule 12(b), 27 MINN. L. REv. 415 (1943); Prashker, New York Rules
of Civil Practice Affecting Motions Directed to Pleadings: The Revision of 1944, 19
ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 1 (1944); Friedman, Comments on Several of the Proposed Amend-
ments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 6 FED. B. J. 206 (1945); Cagen, Post-Trial
Questioning of Defects in Pleadings, 24 CHI-KENT L. REV. 335 (1946); Lathrop, The
Demurrer Ore Tenus, 1947 Wis. L. REv. 426; Mandelker, Use of Demurrer and Directed
Verdict in Negligence Cases, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 603; Tripp, Some Observations on
Motion Practice in New York, 2 SYRACUSE L. REv. 273 (1951).
Comments: Pleading-Foreign Law-Demurrer, 19 COL. L. REV. 246 (1919);
Pleading-Plea in Abatement-Code, 18 MICH. L. REV. 433 (1920); Pleading-Wrong-
ful Death-Statutory Period-Condition Precedent or Limitation Period, 29 YALE L. J.
572 (1920); The Simplification of Civil Practice in New York, 23 CoL. L. REV. 618
at 641-646, 752 (1923); Can the Bar of Statute of Limitations be Asserted on De-
murrer? 30 W. VA. L. REV. 110 (1924); Judgments-Res Judicata-General Dismissal
of a Suit in Equity Upon a Demurrer Sustained, 32 W. VA. L. REV. 248 (1926);
Pleading-Demurrer to an Entire Answer, 24 MICH. L. REv. 312 (1926); Speaking Mo-
tions Under New Federal Rule 12(b)(6), 9 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 174 (1940); Plead-
ing-Federal Procedure-Use of a Speaking Motion Under the New Federal Rules, 15
So. CA L". L. REv. 272 (1942); "Speaking" Motions to Dismiss Under New Rules of
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before any resort to proof."4 Its source is the Germanic allegation-
hearing, not upon the facts, but upon the respective averments of
the parties, with the objective of ascertaining by the judgment of the
court, a determination as to what allegations should be proved. The
judgment preceded the proof and was therefore both a medial or proof
judgment and a final judgment, determining how and by whom the
proof was to be made, and what should be the effect of a failure of
such proof,5 which usually was by oath,6 although sometimes by the
ordeal or the judicial duel. As success or failure of the proof turned
on the perfect execution of the oath formula, and as the allegation to
be verified by the oath was decisive, its irrelevancy would destroy the
whole proceeding. Form, in the primitive mind, was everything, and
thus a defect in form was as fatal as one in substance. Indeed, in the
earlier period of development the "principal ground of irrelevancy was
the lack of form-observance,"7 although a failure as to substance in
the allegation made it ineffective. In time, the parties ceased to be
restricted to the statement of mere legal conclusions and were per-
mitted to introduce facts which, as pertaining to relevancy, opened up
a wider field for the purpose of distinguishing between form and sub-
stance. This had an important bearing upon the common characteris-
tic of all Germanic systems, which was that for good cause the de-
fendant might refuse to answer, because of some extrinsic cause, and
the validity of such refusal was to be determined by the judgment of
Civil Procedure, 14 Rocxy MT. L. REV. 131 (1942); Res Judicata: Effect of Judgment
Entered on Demurrer, 30 CA.a'. L. REv. 487, 488, n.7 (1942); Statute of Limitations
as a Pleading Problem in Iowa, 29 IowA L. REV. 591 (1944); Post-Trial Objections in
Illinois, 43 ILL. L. Rxv. 61 (1948).
Annotations: Admissibility as Evidence of Pleading as Containing Admissions
Against Interest, 14 A.'L.R. 22 (1921); Id., 90 A.L.R. 1393 (1934); Conclusiveness
of Judgment on Demurrer, 102 A.L.R. 434 (1937).
2 Sir Thomas Smith, in 1630, declared: "If the question be of the lawe, that is,
if both the parties agree upon the fact, and each doe claime that by lawe he ought to
have it and will still in that sort maintaine their right, then it is called a demurrer in
lawe." DE REPuBLicA ANGLORum, Lib. 2, c. 13, 73-74 (Batavia 1630; Edition by
Alston, Cambridge 1906).
3 See article by Millar, The Fortunes of the Demurrer, 31 ILL. L. REv. 429 (1936).
4 See article by Millar, The Fortunes of the Demurrer, 31 ILL. L. REv. 429, 430
(1936). And for a general and comparative study of Anglo-American and Continental
Procedure, see Millar, The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure, 18 ILL. L. REv. 1,
94, 150 (1923).
r BRUNNER, ZEUGEN-UND INQUISITIoNSBEWEIS DER KAROLINGSCHE ZEi, FORSCnUN-
GEN ZuR GESCHICTE DES DEUTSCBEN UNDER F.NMzosIscM RECHTES, 89 (Stuttgart
1894).
6 See article by Millar, The Fortunes of the Demurrer, 31 ILL. L, REv. 429, 444
(1936).
7 Id. at 431.
1957]
NEW YORK LAW FORUM
the court. Where the plaintiff's allegation involved an infraction of
form, if brought to attention by the defendant, the defendant was re-
lieved forever from the necessity of answering the complaint. As Pro-
fessor Millar so truly observes: "It is in the Germanic right of refusal
to answer that we find the origin of the objection, endued in the early
English law with the name of dilatory exception, which becomes the
dilatory plea of the developed common-law system. But no less, as we
view it, does that right yield the genesis of the demurrer." 8 And the
grounds of refusal to answer upon Demurrer were based upon objec-
tions as to either form or substance, the latter ground including ob-
jections as to parties plaintiff or defendant and as to subject matter,
which in effect is a claim by the defendant that there is no rule of
substantive law attaching legal consequences to the plaintiff's alle-
gations.
From the foregoing it therefore becomes apparent that the func-
tion of the Demurrer as a device for questioning the relevancy of the
plaintiff's allegation, when the Germanic and Roman elements con-
curred in its development, was the same in principle as that which
prevailed in the early days of English common-law procedure.9 And
with the introduction of the Roman name of exceptio, according to
Pollock and Maitland, 10 "the old reasons for refusing to answer were
brought under the new rubric," to be spoken of thereafter as excep-
tions. By extending this process to later stages of the pleading the
cause was made to turn on the question of relevancy. In 1423 the
Demurrer, when referred to by name, was called an exceptio, which
sometimes operated as a dilatory objection to the writ, a characteris-
tic which lasted until the first part of the eighteenth century.'" But
8 Id. at 433.
9 See BRACTON, DE LEGiBus AND CoNsuEruDnImus ANorLIA, Lib. IV, Tract I,
c. XX (London 1640); BralroN, Bk. II, c. XVII, 253-259 (Trans. by Nichols, Ox-
ford 1865).
10 2 HISTORY OF ENGLISit LAW, Bk. II, c. IX, Pleading and Proof, 611 (2d ed.
Cambridge 1899).
11 See Anonymous, 6 Mod. 195, 87 Eng. Rep. 951 (1704); Dominique v. Davenant,
1 Salk. 228, 91 Eng. Rep. 195 (1795).
See also, on this point, Tyler v. Hand, et al., 7 How. (U. S.) 573, 583 (1849),
in whicl WAYNE, J., declared: "The first [Ground of Objection] is, 'that there is no
sufficient averment in the proceedings showing the citizenship or place of abode of the
plaintiff, or that he is, by reason of the nature of his place of abode and citizenship,
entitled by law to maintain this suit.' This cannot justify the judgment, because it is
demurring in abatement. In such a case the plaintiff is entitled to final judgment. If
the matter of abatement be extrinsic, the defendant must plead it. If intrinsic, the
court will act upon it upon motion, nor notice it of themselves. Dominique v. Davenant,
1 Salk. 220, 91 Eng. Rep. 195 (1795). But it does not follow, because a demurrer in
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the refusal to answer was not directed against the writ; it was also
directed to the point that in law the count or subsequent pleading
was inadequate, and counsel for defendant frequently took the posi-
tion that the law did not call for an answer.1
By the year 1450 the Demurrer had assumed substantially its
modern mode of expression "in which the negation of need to answer
already exhibits crystallization into the words, destined to long cur-
rency, that the demurrant 'has no necessity nor is bound by the law
of the land to answer '13 the opposing pleading."' 4  This was particu-
larly true as to the Demurrer to the plea, the Demurrer to the declara-
tion, strangely enough, being delayed in its mode of expression, but
finally in the sixteenth century adopting the same form of words as
used in the Demurrer to the plea as well as the Demurrer in general. 15
Finally, in Plowden, in 1553, the Demurrer, as fully developed, ap-
peared,' 6 and according to the same authority, it applied to plead-
ings subsequent to the declaration.' 7 Subject to slight modification
abatement cannot be available for the defendant, that it is to be rejected altogether
from the pleading, if tendered in proper time. It will be received, but being erroneously
put in, it entitles the plaintiff to final judgment, so that for this reason the judgment
of the court below would have to be reversed."
12 See HORWOOD, INTRODUCTION TO Y. B. 12 & 13 EDW. IM (Rolls Series) lxxxiii.
13 The Latin phrase read: "necesse non habet neque per legem terrae terretur
respondere."
14 See Y. B. 10 Edw. IV, (1470), in which the demurrer was to a plea in
abatement, and in which the demurrer read: "And the said Agnes, not acknowledging
anything alleged above by the said John Smythe, says that she has no necessity nor
is by the law of the land bound to answer the aforesaid plea of the same John in
manner and form aforesaid pleaded, wherefore she prays judgment and seizin of the
third part of the land aforesaid, together with damages etc. to be adjudged to her etc."
See 47 S.S. § 91.
See, also, Y. B. 49 Hen. VI, (1471), in which the demurrer was to a plea in
bar and in which the demurrer read: "And the aforesaid Abbot now says that he has
no necessity nor is by the law of the land bound to answer the aforesaid plea in
manner and form aforesaid pleaded, wherefore he prays judgment" etc. See 47 S.S.
§ 155.
15 See Millar, The Fortunes of the Demurrer, 31 ILL. L. REV. 429, 438 (1936).
16 The Demurrer, in its final form read: "The aforesaid John and John by Roland
Durant their attorney come and defend the force and injury when, etc. And say that
the matter in the declaration aforesaid above specified is insufficient in law for the
aforesaid William to have and maintain his action aforesaid against them the said John
and John, and that they have no necessity, nor are by the law of the land bound to
answer the said matter in manner and form aforesaid declared: and this they are ready
to verify; wherefore for want of sufficient matter in the said declaration aforesaid
specified, the same John and John pray judgment, and that the aforesaid William may
be precluded from having his action aforesaid against them, etc." King v. Strange &
Croker, 1 Plowd. 77, 78, 75 Eng. Rep. 123, 124 (1553).
17 On Demurrer to a plea, see Colthirst v. Bejushin, 1 Plowd. 21, 22, 23, 75
Eng. Rep. 33 (1550); on Demurrer to a replication, see Wimbish v. Tailbois, 1 Plowd.
38, 42, 75 Eng. Rep. 116 (1550), and on Demurrer to a rejoinder, see Hill v. Grange,
I Plowd. 167, 75 Eng. Rep. 253 (1556).
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the form which appeared in Plowden is the form which has been
handed down by the English authorities on pleading, such as Stephen
and Chitty, to our American lawyers, and "always has it embodied the
protest that the demurrant 'is not bound by law to answer,' carry-
ing thus the vestigial testimony of its historical derivation."'18
According to Lord Coke,19 and later, according to Stephen,20 the
term "Demurrer" came from the Latin word demorari, meaning to
abide, and therefore, observes Coke, "he which demurreth in law is
said to be he that abideth in law: moratur or demoratur in lege. When-
soever the councill learned of the party is of opinion that the count
or plea of the adverse party is insufficient in law, then he demurreth
or abideth in law, and referreth the same to the judgment of the
court."2 ' From Coke's statement, it is clear that a Demurrer was then
recognized as the accepted method of objecting to a pleading in
point of law,22 in exactly the same manner as it operates today. And
when either party stood upon his position, or Demurred, the opposing
party was required to join in Demurrer.3 By the Fourteenth Century
the form of Demurrer had not assumed a stereotyped character, being
in the form of an argumentative summary of the legal point involved,
but with the usual negation of the need to answer. By 1423 the
assignment of grounds" for the Demurrer begins to appear.24 And in
the next fifty years a profound change took place. Thus, in a Year
18 Millar, The Fortunes of the Demurrer, 31 ILL. L. REv. 429, 439 (1936).
Is I Co. Lxrn. Lib. 2, c. 3, § 96 (1st Am. ed. by Day, Philadelphia 1812).
20 A TREATISE ON THE PPINCIPLES OF PLrEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS, C. I, 82 (3d Am.
ed. by Tyler,. Washington, D. C. 1893).
21 1 Co. LII'. Lib. 2, c. 3, § 96 (1st Am. ed. by Day, Philadelphia 1812). And,
see Pickens' Ex'rs. v. Kniseley, 36 W. Va. 794, 15 S. E. 997 (1892), in which Basir-
NON, J., said: "He that demurreth in law is said to abide in law."
22 "Such, however, was not its original use. Maitland has impliedly recognized
this, Horwood has spoken of it, and the fact has received further notice at the hands
of Zane. In reviewing the Year Book of 12 Richard II, edited by Deiser, Zane points
out, with copious references to the text, that, when an objection in point of law was
made to a pleading, that party was said to demur who stood upon his statement,
whether he was the pleader or the objector. Says he, speaking of the Year Book cases
in question: 'The instructive instances of the use of the word may be divided into
two kinds, one class where a pleader states his facts or his law, by way of an excep-
tion, and the court inquires "will you demur there?" i.e., will you stand upon that,
and another class where the reporter states that the pleader did not dare to stand
(demur) upon that. In either case it is apparent that what the word means is stand or
abide upon, and whenever a pleader actually stands upon his proposition, refusing to
go further, the court at once proceeds to judgment.'" Millar, The Fortunes of the
Demurrer, 31 ILL. L. REV. 429, 440 (1936).
23 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTTARIS ON THE LAWS OF ENLAND, c. 21, 316 (7th Ed.,
Oxford 1795).
24 See, De la Pole v. Cok, Y. B. 1 Hen. VI (Selden Soc. Vol. 50) 45 (1423).
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Book case, 25 decided in 1455, Prisot, J. laid down the rule that where
a defendant had Demurred specially (sur un point en special), he could
not take advantage of any defect in the declaration except the one
specified, although both defects in form and in substance would have
been available to him if he had Demurred generally (generalement).
In a second Year Book case,2' decided in 1458, Fortescue, J., declared
that duplicity could only be reached by a Special Demurrer, and not
on the ground of insufficiency. 27 Such assertion indicates that at this
time a written statement, mentioning only the general ground of in-
sufficiency, was made in advance of its oral presentation to the court.
And by 1470, as judged by the record entries of that year, except
in cases of duplicity, on a General Demurrer, no assignment of grounds
was required, both defects in form and in substance being available,
and this status of affairs remained until the enactment of the Statute
of Demurrers in 1585, which required objections as to defects in form
to be specifically assigned. According to Holdsworth, the statements
of Prisot and Fortescue in 1455 and 1458, indicate that the change
by 1470 as to the requirement of assignment of defects was "inti-
mately connected with the transition from oral to written plead-
ings. ' 28 This observation agrees with the generally accepted period
of transition as found by Holdsworth, who declared: "It is in 1460
that we get perhaps the first and certainly an early mention of a
'paper' pleading."2 9 And Millar observes that "The crystallization
[of the demurrer] referred to points to the use of a writing and, in
coincidence with the lack of assignment of grounds, to the use of a
writing prepared in advance of oral disputation on the objection,
rather than a record of an antecedent oral statement. The proba-
bility, therefore, is.that the emergence of the objection as a physical
thing, a distinct paper pleading, be its precise date earlier or later in
the fifteenth century, first gave rise to the need of a distinctive name
for this paper pleading. ' 30 From these developments and in the light
of the statements of Prisot and Fortescue, Millar infers that a "paper"
Demurrer came into existence prior to 1460. In any event a name for
25 34 Hen. VI, Mich. pl. 16.
26 37 Hen. VI, Mich. pl. 10.
27 The holding of this case is in line with the view expressed in the case of Anony-
mous, 3 Salk. 122, 91 Eng. Rep. 729 decided in 1704, which stated the law as it was
prior to the Statute of Elizabeth, 27 Eliz. c. 5, § 1 (1585), to the effect that the
Special Demurrer was seldom used except for duplicity.
28 Millar, The Fortunes of the Demurrer, 31 IL,. L. REv. 429, 444 (1936).
29 3 HorIswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, c. VI, 646 (3d ed., Boston 1927).
3 "The Fortunes of the Demurrer, 31 IL. L. REv. 429, 444 (1936).
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this procedural device was found "in a new use of the substantive
"Demurrer," 31 but the "old use of the term as signifying a concurrence
of the parties in inviting a judgment on the question of relevancy is,
however, slow to give way; it is the formal one and, as before indi-
cated, is destined collaterally to linger into the eighteenth century."
32
II. THE NATURE AND OFFICE OF THE DEMURRER 3
(A) Definition.-The word "Demurrer" is taken from the Latin
word demorari and the French word demeurer, which etymolog-
ically primarily signifies a delay or pause, and is, at common
law, the formal and general mode of disputing the sufficiency in point
of law of the pleading of an adversary, either as to form or substance. 3
More specifically, a Demurrer is a pleading, or procedural device,
which neither asserts nor denies any matter of fact, but which, by
failing to deny the facts in the pleading to which it is interposed,
leaves those facts standing admitted, under the operation of the rule
as to specific traverses, that whatever is not denied at the next suc-
ceeding stage of pleading, stands admitted, with the result that the
only remaining question is one of law as to whether under the sub-
stantive or procedural law the pleading Demurred to is sufficient, that
is, in form and in substance. In other words, the Demurrer was one of
the procedural devices which aided the common law in its issue-making
process.
Thus, for example, let us suppose that the plaintiff, A, files a
declaration in Special Assumpsit in which he alleged a promise, con-
sideration, performance of conditions, if any, breach and damages.
Let us now suppose that B, the defendant, specifically traverses or
denies the consideration. What is in issue? Answer, the consideration
only. What becomes of 'the other four allegations? Answer, they
stand admitted under the operation of the rule as to specific traverses
that whatever is not denied at the next succeeding stage in pleading
stands admitted. And thus, by the operation of the rule as to specific
31 Ibid.
32 Itid.
33 On the election to demur or plead, see SmIAN, HANDBOOK OF COmmON-LAw
PLEADING, c. XII, Demurrer, Aider, and Amendment, § 162 (2d ed. by Ballantine, St.
Paul 1923).
34 MARTI, CIVIL PROCEDURE AT Co mmON LAW, c. IX, Art. 1, § 236 (St. Paul
190).
On the relation of procedure to substantive law, see article by Clark, The Hand-
maid of Justice, 23 WAsr. U. L. Rv. 296 (1937).
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traverses the pleadings have terminated in a single, clear-cut, well-
defined issue of fact, which, as we know, is one of the primary func-
tions of pleading.
Now, let us suppose the same declaration with the same set of
five allegations, to which the defendant interposes a Demurrer. Since
the Demurrer does not deny the facts to which it is interposed, they
stand admitted, under the operation of the same rule that whatever is
not denied at the next stage of pleading stands admitted. The De-
murrer did not admit the facts; the facts stand admitted because the
Demurrer did not deny them. And thus, by the joint operation of the
Demurrer and the rule as to specific traverses, the pleadings this time
have terminated in an issue of law.
In defining a Demurrer, it was stated that it is a pleading; tech-
nically speaking, this is not true; rather a Demurrer is an excuse for
not pleading.35 In other words, by filing a Demurrer to a declaration
the defendant is in effect saying that he is not required to answer on
the merits, because the plaintiff has not stated facts to which the
substantive law attaches legal consequences. Thus, for example, if A
brings Ejectment against B, and alleges ouster and damages, but fails
to allege title, the defendant, by Demurring, is saying that he need
not answer, because the plaintiff, having omitted to allege title, has
not stated sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action in view of the
substantive law of real property which prescribes title as one of the
elements essential to the statement of a cause of action in Ejectment.
But while, in a certain sense, a Demurrer is not a pleading, in
another sense, it is a pleading: that is, in the sense that if it is inter-
posed to a declaration, it will prevent the entry of a judgment by de-
fault,36 in substantially the same way as would any defense on the
35 Haiton v. Jeffreys, 10 Mod. 280, 88 Eng. Rep. 728 (1715).
In Welsh v. Blackwell, 14 N. J. L. 344, 346 (1834), HORNBLOWER, C. J., said:
"The word 'pleading,' when used in a large or general sense, comprehends, not only the
declaration and special or other pleas, but demurrers. But the term 'plea' or 'to plead,'
when used in a limited and appropriated sense, excludes the idea of a demurrer; and
words of a doubtful or ambiguous meaning, ought always to be understood and ex-
plained in reference to the subject matter, and the occasion on which they were used.
1 Blackstone, Commentaries 60."
And that the Demurrer is also regarded as an excuse for not pleading under the
Code, see Cashman v. Reynolds, 123 N. Y. 138, 25 N. E. 162 (1890).
36 "But while a demurrer is not, in this limited sense, a plea, it is so far a plead-
ing as to prevent the entry of a judgment by default." Oliphant v. Whitney, 34 Cal.
25, 27 (1867).
On the reopening of default judgments, see Note, Judgmets-Defalt-Reopening,
37 YALE L. J. 122 (1927).
1957]
NEW YORK LAW FORUM
merits. Thus, for instance, if A declares in Ejectment, alleging title,
ouster and damages, and B fails to answer, a judgment by default will
be entered. Such, however, would not be the case if B interposed a
Demurrer. In the sense that such use of a Demurrer will, like any
other plea to the merits, prevent the entry of a judgment by default,
it may be regarded as a pleading.
(B) The Office of a Demurrer.-The office of a Demurrer is to
raise an issue of law as to whether on the face of a declaration,
assuming the facts to be true, the plaintiff has stated facts, which as
a matter of substantive law, entitle him to the redress which he seeks.
If he fails to include an allegation required by the substantive law,
this constitutes a substantive defect, which, if apparent upon the face
of the declaration, may be reached, at the pleading stage by Demurrer;
after verdict and before judgment, by motion in arrest of judgment;
and after judgment, by writ of error. At the trial stage, the same
defect might possibly be reached by objection to the introduction of
evidence, by motion for nonsuit, or for judgment on the pleadings.
If, however, the plaintiff includes in his declaration all the alle-
gations required by the substantive law to state a good cause of
action, but states these allegations in violation of some rule of plead-
ing, he is said to be guilty of a defect in form, which may be reached
at the next succeeding stage of pleading by a Special Demurrer. Thus,
to illustrate, if the plaintiff in Ejectment, by way of stating title, al-
leged that he had a "grant deed" of Blackacre, his declaration would
be bad on Special Demurrer, as having stated an evidentiary fact,
which violates the rule of pleading that the plaintiff should have stated
the ultimate fact of title, to wit, that he was "seized" of Blackacre.
If he had omitted any statement whatsoever as to title, he would have
been guilty of a substantive defect, which is generally available on
General Demurrer. Generally speaking, therefore, a Special Demurrer
was used to reach defects in form; while a General Demurrer was used
to reach defects in substance; but since a Special Demurrer includes a
General Demurrer, a Special Demurrer may also reach defects in sub-
stance, for reasons which will be explained in connection with the
effect of the Statute of Demurrers in 1585.11
(C) Effect of Documents Attached to Declaration or Other
Pleading.-At common law a document could not be made a part of
the declaration or other pleading by annexing the paper to the plead-
3T 27 Eliz. c. 5, § 1, 6 Statutes at Large 360 (1585).
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ing. If it was desirable to call the courts' attention to the contents
of a written document, this end could be accomplished by pleading the
document according to its legal effect, or by setting it out verbatim,
or as was said, in haec verba. In this way a document in effect became
a part of the pleading, and could be considered upon a Demurrer. But
where a paper was merely made a part of a pleading by the process
of annexation, it could not be considered upon a Demurrer; and upon
a Demurrer to such a pleading, its sufficiency was measured only by
what appeared upon the face of the pleading, entirely unaffected by
any facts or circumstances as shown by the annexed document 8 In
some states the rule is contrariwise and hence the annexed paper may
be relied upon if attached to the pleading in question and expressly
referred to and declared to be a part of the pleading to which the
Demurrer is interposed. 9 Where it is permitted, as in many Code
states, the Demurrer takes into consideration the contents of the an-
38 Maryland: Hanover Ins. Co. v. Brown, 77 Md. 64, 25 At. 989 (1893); West
Virginia: Hall v. Coal Co., 89 W. Va. 55, 108 S. E. 491 (1921).
In Hoskins v. Orlando, 51 F. 2d 901, 902 (5th Cir. 1931), in referring to the effect
of documents annexed to the pleading, SIBLEY, J., stated: "We are first confronted
with the question whether these instruments are a part of the pleading on demurrer
under the Florida practice and the Conformity Statute (28 U. S. C. A. § 724). Com-
mon-law pleading obtains in Florida with statutory modifications. Though exhibits
were commonly used in chancery practice, they were unknown to the common law.
A writing relied on by the common-law pleader was alleged according to its legal
effect, or, if that was doubtful, the pertinent provisions might be set forth verbatim.
No reference to any document imported it into the pleading. An unsealed writing was
merely evidence, and not to be produced until the trial; but if a deed were relied on,
because of the estoppel incident to it, it had to be produced in court by the pleader,
and profert made of it. The opposite party might then demand oyer of it, that is, to
hear it read, and thereupon he might found a demurrer on it by reciting its contents
in his demurrer, and it was then treated as a part of the pleading of the party who
produced it. Stephen, Pleading, p. 66, and ff. 437; 44 C. J., Pleading, §§ 865, 870, 875.
By the statutes of Florida profert and oyer of deeds is abolished. Comp. Gen. Laws
1927, § 4292. But by section 4313(a), 'all bonds, notes, bills of exchange, covenants
and accounts upon which suit may be brought, or a copy thereof, shall be filed with
the declaration.' The statute requires mere filing with, and not attachment as an
exhibit to the declaration, and it has been consistently held by the Supreme Court of
Florida not to result in making the paper a part of the declaration on demurrer. A
contrary view of a similar statute was taken by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the City of Nauvoo v. Ritter, 97 U. S. 389, 24 L. Ed. 1050. Nevertheless,
the practice of attaching exhibits to the declaration has been persisted in, and it is
now held by the Florida court that an attached exhibit may by apt words in the
declaration be made a part of it; and without such words, if it be so treated in the
lower court the reviewing court will likewise so regard it. State v. Seaboard Air Line
Ry., 56 Fla. 670, 47 So. 986; National Surety Co. v. Williams, 74 Fla. 446, 77 So. 212;
Shelton v. Eisemann, 75 Fla. 644, 79 So. 75; Reinschmidt v. Crosby, 98 Fla. 365, 123
So. 755, 124 So. 4."
39 Metzger v. Canadian & European Credit System Co., 59 N. J. L. 340, 36 At]
661 (1896).
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nexed paper, which may serve to maintain defeat or modify the con-
tention of the pleader °
Papers thus annexed should not be confused with Bills of Par-
ticulars, which are designed to compel a plaintiff, who has declared
generally, to make his allegations, as to his cause of action, more cer-
tain and specific, as, for example, the details concerning the statemefit
of an account.4 ' Thus where, in Case for negligence, the plaintiff de-
clared generally that he was "negligently injured" the defendant was
allowed a bill of particulars which required the plaintiff to make this
declaration more specific.42 The states differ in their practice as to
whether a pleading supplemented by a bill of particulars is affected
upon a Demurrer; 43 in some states the bill is treated as a part of the
pleading and hence is considered in passing on its sufficiency, whereas,
in others, the bill is not regarded as a part of the declaration or other
pleading, in passing on its legal sufficiency."
(D) The Import of a Demurrer in Pleading.-A Demurrer, as we
have seen, imports in pleading, that the party will await the judgment
of the court as to whether he is bound to answer, and will not proceed
with the pleadings because he contends that no sufficient statement of
fact has yet been made to which the substantive law attaches legal
liability. In short, it advances the legal proposition that the pleading
Demurred to is insuffi6ient in law to maintain the case stated by the
adverse party.45 A Demurrer may be entered by either party and to
any pleading until an issue is joined; 46 and it may be for insufficiency
either in substance, as that the case shown by the opposite party is
40 See City of Nauvoo v. Ritter, 97 U. S. 389, 24 L. Ed. 1050 (1878).
41 Thus, where the plaintiff sued on the common counts only, it was held that
the defendant could demand a bill of particulars. Vila v. Weston, 33 Conn. 42 (1865).
On the bill of particulars under the Code and its relation to the Code motion to
make a pleading more definite and certain, see article by Simpson, A Possible Solution
of the Pleading Problem, 53 HAsv. L. Rav. 169, 191, n. 40 (1939).
42 Tilton v. Beecher, 59 N. Y. 176 (1874).
43 Hoskins v. Orlando, 51 F. 2d 901 (5th Cir. 1931). See, also, Union Trust Co.
v. Wilson, 182 N. C. 166, 108 S. E. 500 (1921).
44 Standard Co. v. Hale, 148 Va. 400, 139 S. E. 300 (1927).
45 People v. Holton, 259 I. 219, 222, 102 N. E. 171, 172 (1913).
A Demurrer to a declaration cannot properly be said to be a plea to the merits,
except in cases where a judgment on the Demurrer in favor of the defendant would
be a bar to a subsequent suit on the same cause of action; and this can never be the
case where the declaration is defective only for the want of some necessary averment.
Quarles v. Waldron, 20 Ala. 217 (1852). And see Hickok v. Coates, 2 Wend. (N. Y.)
419, 20 Am. Dec. 632 (1829). Cf. Alabama: Gillapsie v. Wesson, 7 Port. (Ala.) 454,
31 Am. Dec. 715 (1838); Arkansas: Auditor v. Woodruff, 2 Ark. 73, 33 Am. Dec.
368 (1839).
46 1 Co. Lirr. Lib. 2, c. 3, § 96 (1st Am. ed. by Day, Philadelphia 1812); 7
BACON'S AEiRDOMENT, "Pleas," (N) 2, 462 (Philadelphia 1845).
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wanting in an essential element, as, for example, where a declaration
in special assumpsit for breach of a contract fails to allege considera-
tion or a promise; or in form, as that the matter alleged is substan-
tially sufficient, but is stated in such an artificial manner as to violate
a rule of pleading. For it is a cardinal principle of law that every
pleading must contain matter sufficient in point of substantive law to
constitute a cause of action or a defense, and that such matter must
be deduced and alleged according to the form required by law, or
without violating any rule of pleading as to how substantive allega-
tions of any character must be set forth; and, if either of these re-
quirements be wanting, it is cause for Demurrer,4 7 general if the defect
is substantive, special if it is formal.
By a Demurrer the party Demurring tenders an issue. It is not
an issue in fact, but an issue in law, the question raised being whether
the pleading Demurred to is sufficient, as a matter of law, assuming
the facts to be true because not denied, to require the party Demur-
ring to answer it. As questions of law are for the determination of
the court, the Demurrer refers the issue to the judgment of the court.
48
III. THE SPEAKING DEMURRER
WHEN a party Demurs to an adversary's pleading, his object is
to raise an issue in point of law as to whether the facts alleged are
sufficient to sustain his opponent's cause of action or defense, as the
case may be. If the Demurrer is successful it eliminates any necessity
to answer on the part of the Demurrant. It follows, therefore, that
the Demurrant must accept the facts alleged in the pleading De-
murred to exactly" as stated, and that the Demurrer should be free
from any allegations of fact additional to those alleged in the plead-
ing to which it is interposed. And it should neither deny the facts
stated, nor expand, reduce, modify or vary in any respect the facts
47 English: Colt & Gloon v. Bishop of Coventry and Litchfield, Hob. 140, 80 Eng.
Rep. 290 (1614); Georgia: Wallace v. Holly, 13 Ga. 389, 58 Am. Dec. 518 (1853);
Michigan: Stout v. Keyers, 2 Dong. (Mich.) 183, 43 Am. Dec. 165 (1895). See, also,
Illinois: Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. People ex rel., Van Gilden, 149 Ill. 663, 36 N. E. 989
(1894).
A Demurrer is but a legal exception to the sufficiency of a pleading. Mason v.
Cater, 192 Iowa 143, 182 N. W. 179 (1921); Wood v. Papendick, 268 Ill. 385, 109
N. E. 266 (1915).
48 A pleading which, with all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader, shows
facts entitling him to relief, is not subject to Demurrer, the office of which is to raise an
issue of law as to the substantial rights of the parties. Soghn v. Koetzle, 38 S. D. 99,
160 N. W. 520 (1916).
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stated in the pleadings challenged.4 9 A Demurrer which denies any
fact in the pleading to which it is addressed, or which, in order te
sustain itself, requires the suggestion of additional facts not appear-
ing on the face of the pleading objected to,5" or seeks in any way to
change or qualify the statement of facts presented in the adverse plead-
ing, is called a Speaking Demurrer."1 Such a Demurrer is customarily
overruled because, as a Speaking Demurrer, it violates a rule of plead-
ing and is out of order.52 In some cases, however, if such a Demurrer
raises a meritorious point of law, it may be considered, the fact im-
pertinently suggested being ignored.58
IV. THE DEMURRER DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER
PLEADINGS
THE distinction between a Demurrer and other pleading is that a
Demurrer raises an objection as to the intrinsic insufficiency of the
pleading to which it is interposed, whereas a plea, replication, re-
joinder or other pleading containing a statement of facts undertakes
to defeat the adversary by the injection into the case of matter col-
lateral to that which has been alleged by the party against whom the
pleading is directed. 4 Because of this distinction the common-law rule
and the rule under the Statute of Anne (1705)r s was that a party
could not plead and Demur at the same time to the same action or
defense. One was not at common law permitted to plead and Demur
49 "It is not the office of a Demurrer to allege facts." Jennings v. Peoria Co., 196
Ill. App. 195, 198 (1915); Wood v. Papendick, 269 Ill. 383, 109 N. E. 266 (1915).
50 As, for example, where a Demurrer suggests that another suit between the same
parties and involving the same subject-matter is pending. Missouri: Arthur v. Rickards,
48 Mo. 298 (1871). See, also, Alabama: Watts v. Kennamer, 216 Ala. 64, 112 So. 333
(1927); Federal: Card v. Standard Co., 202 Fed. 351 (1912).
51 Georgia: Clark v. Land Co., 113 Ga. 21, 38 S. E. 323 (1901); Michigan:
Walker v. Conant, 65 Mich. 194, 31 N. W. 786 (1912); New York: Brooks v. Gibbong,
4 Paige (N. Y.) 374 (1834).
52 Connecticut: Husbands v. Aetna Co., 93 Conn. 194, 105 AtU. 480 (1919);
Illinois: People v. Holten, 259 11. 219, 102 N. E. 171 (1913); Federal: United States
v. Forbes, 259 Fed. 585 (1919), aff'd 268 Fed. 273 (1920).
On the Speaking Demurrer under modem codes, see CLARX, HANDBOOK op ma LAW
OF CoDe PLEADmiNG, c. 8, § 80, 514 (2d ed., St. Paul 1947).
An interesting dispute as to "speaking motions" has arisen under the Federal Rules
as to which, see CL.AIU, HANDBOOK OF TnE LAW OF CODE PLEADING, c. 8, § 86, 537-545
(2d ed., St. Paul 1947).
53 Graham v. Spence, 71 N. 3. Eq. 183, 63 Atl. 344 (1906).
54 Walker v. Perkins, 3 Burr. 1568, 97 Eng. Rep. 985 (1764).
55 4 Anne, c. 16, § 4, 11 Statutes at Large 156, which provided: "And be it further
enacted by the authority aforesaid, That from and after the first day of Trinity term
it shall and may be lawful for any defendant or tenant in any action or suit, or for
any plaintiff in replevin, in any court of record, with the leave of the same court,
to plead as many several matters thereto, as he shall think necessary for his defence."
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because of the incongruity between the plea and the Demurrer, the
former raising an issue of fact, the latter an issue of law, and both
issues could not be considered, as defendant was only entitled to a
single defense. This same rule was not altered by the Statute of Anne
(1705), as it merely permitted a defendant to plead several defenses,
and a Demurrer, as we have seen, was strictly speaking not a plea,
but rather an excuse for not pleading.58
V. THE SCOPE OF A DEMURRER
TiE Demurrer may be used as an offensive instrument for an
attack upon an adversary's pleading. And such attack may be di-
rected at the whole of the plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's
defense, as the case may be, or to a part only. In making such a use
of the Demurrer, a defendant in Demurring to a declaration in its en-
tirety, must be certain that his Demurrer is not too large. Thus, for
example, in Cochran v. Scott,57 the plaintiff declared as the indorser
of a promissory note, payable to the Lawrence Power Company, al-
leging an inducement by the company, and setting forth the names of
the members of the firm; he also declared on several money counts;
the defendant Demurred to the whole declaration, assigning special
cause for only one count, and none for the others; and the court gave
judgment for the plaintiff. Where a declaration contains several
counts or statements of causes of action, some good in both form and
substance, and some good in substance but bad in form, the defendant
should Demur only to the defective counts, as judgment would be
given against him on an exception to the whole declaration, separate
and divisible parts of it being good.5 If, however, the defendant had
Demurred to each count, and had specifically pointed out the defects
in those counts formally inadequate, they would have been defeated,
with a consequent decrease in the plaintiff's recovery of damages.59
56 See Gou-D, A TREAris. ON THE PINqciPLES OF PLEAnG, Pt. III, c. 3, Of
Pleading, 340 (6th ed. by Will, Albany 1909).
57 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 229 .(1829). See, also, the following cases: Illinois: Nash v.
Nash, 16 Ill. 79 (1854); New York: Mumford v. Fitzhugh, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 456
(1821). And, see, North Carolina: Conant v. Barbard, 103 N. C. 315, 9 S. E. 575
(1889).
58 Ibid. And that the rule under the Code-that the demurrer must not be too
large--is the same as at common law, see Laslie v. Gragg Lumber Co., 184 Ga. 794,
193 S. E. 763 (1937). Cf. Herman v. Hart, 192 App. Div. 608, 183 N. Y. Supp. 220
(1920).
On Demurrer to part of a pleading, or to a pleading good in part, see DacwaiA
DIGEsTS, Pleading, 204.
59 English: Benbridge v. Day, 1 Salk. 218, 91 Eng. Rep. 193 (1691); Powick v.
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But if the fault consists of the fact that the parties or causes of action
have been improperly joined the Demurrer should be to the whole
declaration."
But a plaintiff's Demurrer to several defenses, some good in form
and substance and some bad in either form or substance, can never
be too large, as a defendant needs but one defense to win. Thus, in
Mayor, &c. of Newark v. Dickerson, et al.,6' where the plaintiff de-
clared in debt against a surety on a bond, to which the defendant in-
terposed ten pleas, one of which was good in substance, whereas the
others were bad, and the court, through Dixon, J., said: "If any of
the pleas demurred to presents a good defense, the defendant is en-
titied to judgment. '6 2 In other words, a Demurrer to a defense pre-
senting several pleas, some good, some bad, cannot be too large.
Whether the Demurrer is used as an offensive or defensive weapon,
the pleader should be careful not to plead and Demur at the same time
to the same matter, as such a course of procedure would violate a
fundamental theory of common-law pleading that you cannot create
an issue of law and an issue of fact simultaneously on the same plead-
ing.
VI. KINDS AND FORMS OF DEMURRERS
BEFORE 1585
Foim oF GENERAL DEMURRER
(For Matter of Substance)
IN THE KiNG'S BENCH. (In Debt)





AND the said Clyde Dowell, by William Jones, his attorney, comes and
Lyon, 11 East 565, 103 Eng. Rep. 1123 (1809); New York: Douglas v. Satterlee, 11
Johns. (N. Y.) 16 (1814); Federal: Greathouse v. Dunlop, 3 McLean 303, Fed. Cas.
No. 5,724 (1839).
60 "A demurrer, though frequently called 'an issue in law' may, with more pro-
priety, be said to tender such an issue. For the issue is not formal, until there is a
joinder in demurrer, which affirms the legal sufficiency of the allegations demurred
to in contradiction of the demurrer, which affirms their legal insufficiency." GouLD,
A TREATISE oN T E PRtNcIPLs oF PLEADIxG, c. V, Of Demurrers, 571 (6th ed. by Will,
Albany 1909).
61 45 N. J. L. 38 (1883).
62 Id. at 39.
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defends the wrong and injury, when, etc., and says that the said declaration
and the matters therein contained, in manner and form as the same are
above stated and set forth, are not sufficient in law for the said Arthur
Brown to have or maintain his aforesaid action against him, the said Clyde
Dowell; and that he, the said Clyde Dowell, is not bound by the law of the
land to answer the same. And this he is ready to verify. Wherefore, for
want of a sufficient declaration in this behalf, the said Clyde Dowell prays
for judgment, and that the said Arthur Brown may be barred from having
or maintaining his aforesaid action against him, etc.
WILL.IAM JONES
Attorney for Defendant
STEPHEN, Principles of Pleading in Civil Actions, c. I, 82 (3d Am. Ed.
by Tyler, Washington, D.C. 1895).
Folzi OF JOINDER IN DE.muRRER 3
IN THE KING'S BENCH.





AND the said Arthur Brown says that the said declaration and the mat-
ters therein contained, in manner and form as the same are above pleaded
and set forth, are sufficient in law for him, the said Arthur Brown, to have
and maintain his aforesaid action against him, the said Clyde Dowell. And
the said Arthur Brown is ready to verify and prove the same as the court
shall direct and award. Wherefore, inasmuch as the said Clyde Dowell
63 A party could not decline a question on the legal sufficiency of his own plead-
ing without abandoning it. The acceptance was therefore as imperative as in the case
of an issue of fact and this end was secured by use of a set form of words called "the
joinder in demurrer." With respect to issues in law tendered by Demurrer, it was im-
material whether the issue was well or ill-tendered, that is, whether the Demurrer was
in proper form or not. In either case the opposite party was equally bound to join
in Demurrer; for it was a rule that there could be no Demurrer upon a Demurrer.
[Campbell v. St. John, 1 Salk. 219, 91 Eng. Rep. 194 (1693). But see Townsend v.
Jemison, 7 How. (U. S.) 706, 12 L. Ed. 880 (1849)], and there was no ground for a
traverse or pleading in confession and avoidance, while the pleading to which the De-
murrer was taken still remained unanswered.
For the common-law rule, see Campbell v. St. John, 1 Salk. 219, 91 Eng. Rep.
194 (1694).
And for thi Code rule that no formal joinder in Demurrer is required, see Conn.
Prac. Bk., § 102, 46 (1934).
But where an issue in law was tendered by Demurrer the opposing party was re-
quired to join it. English: Horton v. Jeffreys, 10 Mod. 280, 88 Eng. Rep. 728 (1715);
Illinois: Clay Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Wusterhausen, 75 Ill. 285 (1874); Maryland:
Brown v. Jones, 10 Gill & J. (Md.) 334 (1839).
1957l
NEW YORK LAW FORUM
hath not answered the said declaration, nor hitherto in any manner denied
the same, the said Arthur Brown prays judgment, and his debt aforesaid,
together with his damages by him sustained, by reason of the detention
thereof, to be adjudged to him.
STEPHEN, Principles of Pleading in Civil Actions, c. I, 92 (3d Am. Ed.
by Tyler, Washington, D.C. 1895).
(A) The General and Special Demurrer Under the Regime of
Oral Pleading.-Prior to the Statute of Elizabeth (1585),64 variously
cited or described in the books as the Statute of Demurrers or the
Statute of Jeofails,65 there were two kinds of Demurrer, the General
Demurrer and 'the Special. According to the case, Anonymous,60 de-
cided in 1704, in which the opinion was rendered by Chief Jus-
tice Holt of the Court of King's Bench, upon a General Demurrer, a
party might take advantage of all types of defects, formal or sub-
stantive,17 that of duplicity only excepted, and without the assignment
of any cause for Demurrer. Upon a Special Demurrer, so called be-
cause it assigned a specific cause of Demurrer, formal defects were
available as on a General Demurrer. As these ordinary formal defects
were reached by a General Demurrer without the necessity of specifi-
cally pointing them out as was required in a Special Demurrer, the lat-
ter form of Demurrer was never necessary, except in a case involving
duplicity.6 In such case it was not sufficient to say that the plead-
04 27 Eliz. c. 5, § 1, 6 Statutes at Large 360.
65 The word "Jeofails" means, I have failed; I am in error. Certain statutes in
English law are referred to as statutes of amendment and jeofails, because where a
pleader perceives any slip in the form of his proceedings, and acknowledges the error
(jeofals) he is at liberty by those statutes to amend it.
For a complete list of the statutes, the earliest of which was enacted in 1340, 14
Edw. m, c. 6, 1 Statutes at Large 474, see article by Reppy, The Hilary Rules and
Their Effect on Negative and Afirmative Pleas Under Modern Codes and Practice
Acts, 6 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rv. 95, 100, n. 19 (1929).
For a partial listing of these statutes, see, also, 1 Tmn, TnE PRAcrcaE or TnE COURT
OF K3NG'S BE=H, c. XXX, 658-660 (2d Am. Ed., New York 1807); Clark & Yerion,
Aider and Amendment, 12 MiNx. L. REV. 97, 125 (1928).
And, for a discussion of the principal statutes of Jeofails, see Scott, FUNDA.MW-
TALs oF PRoc aou- iN Acrboxs AT LAW, c. V, Amendments and Jeofails, 143 (New
York 1922).
00 3 Salk. 122, 91 Eng. Rep. 729 (1704).
87 "Originally at common law all objections reached by demurrer, whether of
form or substance, might be raised under the general claim that the prior pleading
was insufficient in law without disclosing in detail the nature of the objection." CrAK,
THE HANDooon oF TnE LAW OF CODE PLEADiN , c. 8, § 79, 507 (2d ed. St. Paul 1947).
8 Anonymous, 3 Salk. 122, 91 Eng. Rep. 729 (1704). See, also, Tucker v. Ran-
dall, 2 Mass. 283 (1807).
Duplicity in the declaration was a common ground for Special Demurrer at corn-
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ing was double, or contained two matters, but the party Demurring
was required to show of what the duplicity consisted. 9 Perhaps the
reason for this exception may be discovered in the peculiarity of this
specific defect. Technically, duplicity constituted neither a formal nor
a substantive defect, that is, it was not a substantive defect, because
not too few, but rather too many facts had been alleged; and it was
not a defect in form, for what was alleged had been stated without
violation of a rule of pleading, hence the only defect present-the
statement of superfluous facts-was held to be available only on
Special Demurrer.
As long as the practice remained in this state, little difficulty was
experienced; for the pleadings at bar being oral or by word of mouth,
and the exceptions taken ore tenu 0 (orally), the causes of Demurrer,
whether formal or substantive, were as well known upon a General
Demurrer, as upon a Special one.
(B) The Effect of the Introduction of Written Pleadings Upon
the Law of Demurrers.-But after the reformation, when the practice
of pleading at Bar was altered, or ceased to be oral, probably around
1460, the use of General Demurrers continued. As a result the public
suffered great inconvenience as the parties went on to argument with-
out knowing what points were to be argued, as they were not specifi-
cally set down on a General Demurrer, although available if discov-
ered. Perhaps an illustration would clarify the matter. Suppose A
instituted an Action of Ejectment against B, in which he alleges by
way of title that he has a "grant deed" of Blackaore, ouster and
damages, and then suppose that the defendant interposes a General
Demurrer. The declaration is defective in that A, in stating title, has
alleged an evidentiary fact, a deed being merely evidence of title; A
should have alleged that he was seized of Blackacre. In this state of
the pleadings the Demurrer comes on for argument. B, well knowing
of the defect in form, argues, let us say, that A has not sufficiently
alleged ouster, completely and deliberately overlooking the formal
mon law. Handy v. Chatfield, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 35 (1840). But for the attitude of
the courts of today on duplicity, see Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Bates Expanded
Steel Truss Co., 11 F. 2d 415 (1926). And in England, under the influence of the
Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, § 51), which provided that
"no pleading shall be deemed insufficient for any defect which could heretofore only be
objected to 'by special demurrer," duplicity, along with other formal defects, ceased
to be available on Demurrer. The remedy is now by motion. See, REPPY, INTRODUC-
TION TO C:vm PRocF.uaa 518 (Buffalo 1954).
09 Carter v. Davis, 1 Salk. 219, 91 Eng. Rep. 194 (1705).
70 See article by Lathrop, The Demurrer Ore Tenus, 1947 Wis. L. REV. 426.
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defect as to title in A's declaration. His Demurrer being overruled, B
then withdraws his Demurrer, enters a plea to the merits and goes
to trial, where the plaintiff wins. After verdict and before judgment,
by motion in arrest of judgment, or after judgment, by writ of error,
B then comes forward to urge the failure of A to allege that he was
seized of Blackacre and that, therefore, A was guilty of a defect in
form, upon which the judgment may be reversed, although the defend-
ant had had a perfectly fair trial upon the merits of the controversy.
(C) The Statute of Elizabeth (1585).-In consequence, the de-
fendant was either constrained to lose his right, or after great delay,
trouble and expense, to renew again his suit. And it was this great
hindrance of justice, resulting in the reversal of a judgment upon
some small defect in form, resulting in delay, new trials and mis-
trials, and increased costs, which finally created the demand for re-
form which found expression in the Statute of Elizabeth,1 the chief
purpose of which was to discourage the practice of taking objection
to pleadings which were merely defective in form. The Statute is set
out below:
STATUTE OF 27 ELIZABETH, (1585)
(c. 5, § 1, 6 Statutes at Large, 360)
FopAsmucH as excessive charges and expenses, and great de-
lay and hindrance of justice hath grown in actions and suits between
the subjects of this realm, by reason that upon some small mistaking
or want of form in pleading, judgments are often reversed by writs
of error, and oftentimes upon demurrers in law given otherwise than
the matter in law and every right of the cause doth require, whereby
the parties are constrained either utterly to lose their right, or else,
after long time and great trouble and expenses, to renew again their
suits: for remedy whereof, be it enacted by the Queen's most excellent
majesty, the lords spiritual and temporal, and the commons, in this
present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that
from henceforth, after demurrer joined and entered in any action or
suit in any court of record within this realm, the judges shall proceed
and give judgment according as the very right and cause of the matter
in law shall appear unto them, without regarding any imperfection, de-
fect, or want of form in any writ, return, plaint, declaration, or other
pleading, process, or course of proceeding whatsoever, except those
only which the party demurring shall specially and particularly set
downr and express together with his demurrer; and that no judgment
71 27 Eliz. c. 5, § 1, 6 Statutes at Large 360 (1585).
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to be given shall be reversed by any writ of error, for any such im-
perfection, defect, or want of form as is aforesaid, except such only
as is before excepted.72
VII. KINDS AND FORMS OF DEMURRERS AFTER 1585
Fom oF SPECIAL DEmuRR
(For Matter of Form)
IN THE KING'S BENCH. (In Debt)





AND the said Clyde Dowell, by William Jones, his attorney, comes
and defends the wrong and injury, when, etc., and says that the said
declaration and the matters therein contained in manner and form as the
same are above stated and set forth, are not sufficient in law for the said
Arthur Brown to have or maintain his aforesaid action against him, the
said Clyde Dowell; and that he, the said Clyde Dowell, is not bound by the
law of the land to answer the same. And this he is ready to verify. Where-
fore, for want of a sufficient declaration in this behalf, the said Clyde
Dowell prays for judgment, and that the said Arthur Brown may be
barred from having or maintaining his aforesaid action against him,
etc. And the said Clyde Dowell, [according to the form of the statute
in such case made and provided], states and shows to the court here
the following [special] causes of demurrer to the said declaration: that is
to say, that no day or time is alleged in the said declaration at which the
said causes of action or any of them are supposed to have accrued. [That
the declaration is double in this, that is to say.] And also that the said




STEPHEN, Principles of Pleading in Civil Actions, c. I, 83 (3d Am. Ed.
by Tyler, Washington, D.C. 1895).
(A) What the Siatute of Elizabeth Provided.-What did the
Statute of Elizabeth provide and what was the effect of such provi-
sion? It provided that upon Demurrer joined and entered in any
72 The italics are the author's.
73 Ibid. Under the Code, as under the later common law, no formal joinder in
demurrer, a form of which is set forth above, is required. Connecticut Practice Book,
§ 102, 46 (1946).
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action or suit in any court, the judges should give judgment "accord-
ing as the very right and cause of the matter shall appear unto them"
without regarding any defect in form whatsoever, "except those only
which the party demurring shall specially and particularly set down
and express together with his demurrer."
What, in plain English, does this mean? The phrase, "according
as the very right and cause of the matter in law shall appear unto
them" translated into plain English, means that the judges thereafter
shall decide the cases on the merits, and in complete disregard of
any imperfection, defect or want of form in any pleading, except those
only which the Demurring party specifically points out and sets down
"together with his Demurrer." What demurrer? Answer, the General
Demurrer. A Special Demurrer therefore, under the specific language
of the statute, is merely a General Demurrer, to which is added a
specification or pointing out of some defect in form in an adversary's
pleading, as indicated by the italicized part of the form of a Special
Demurrer set out above. In other words, the statute provides that de-
fects in form are aided or waived unless taken advantage of by Special
Demurrer at the next succeeding stage in pleading.
Defects in form, after the statute, might, however, still prove
fatal, but only if specifically objected to by openly pointing out the
defect at the next stage of pleading.7 Thus, in the famous case of
Heard v. Baskerville,7 . decided in 1614, or only twenty-nine years
after the enactment of the statute, the plaintiff A, brought Replevin
against the defendant B, as bailiff to C, claiming that he was seized
in fee, and granted a rent of two shillings, with a clause of distress,
etc., without showing how his cousin and heir became seized. And the
74 "This statute, by making known the causes of demurrer, was so far restorative
of the common law; and as a general demurrer did confess all matters formerly
pleaded, so by this statute, whenever the right sufficiently appeared to the court, it
confessed all matters, though pleaded informally." 1 TmD, THE PRaCTIc. or aH CouRT
or KNG's BExCH, c. XXX, 648 (2d Am. ed., New York 1807).
And that failure to raise defects by Special Demurrer operates to waive defects in
the same manner as at common law, see Kremer v. Kremer, 221 App. Div. 247, 225
N. Y. Supp. 260 (1927). In New York, however, by reason of the statutory pro-
vision, New York Code of Civil Procedure, § 499, now superseded by the New York
Civil Practice Act, § 278, there is an exception as to waiver, as to a lack of jurisdic-
tion, and as to an objection that the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
See, also, English: King v. Rotham, Freem. 38, 89 Eng. Rep. 30 (1672); Illinois:
Cook v. Scott, 1 Gilman (Ill.) 333 (1844); Gordon v. Bankard, 37 Ill. 147 (1865);
Ever v. Armstrong, 66 MII. 267 (1872); Massachusetts: Steefe v. Old Colony R. Co.,
156 Mass. 262, 30 N. E. 1137 (1892); Vermont: Wiley v. Carpenter, 64 Vt. 212, 23
At]. 630, 15 L.R.A. 853 (1892).
75 Hob. 232, 80 Eng. Rep. 378 (1614).
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issue at law upon a General Demurrer was whether "the not setting
down the matter of cousinage," that is, the line of descent, were mat-
ter of substance, or only of form, such as by the Statute of Demur-
rers, 27 Eliz. c. 5 [§ 1], ought to be particularly set down, or else
no advantage be taken of it. The court held that the failure to set
out the "matter of cousinage" or line of descent in detail was a mere
matter of form, and since this defect in form was not specifically
pointed out and expressed in the Demurrer, it was waived. A General
Demurrer, therefore, automatically waives all defects in form, except
in the case of a plea in abatement.
(B) Effect of the Statute Upon Common-Law Demurrers.-
What, we may now inquire, was the effect of the statute? It had
several effects. In the first place, it altered the relative positions of
the two types of Demurrers. Before the statute, upon a General De-
murrer, a party Demurring might reach either a formal or substan-
tive defect in an adverse pleading; after the statute, on a General De-
murrer, only substantive defects were available, with but one excep-
tion which will be noticed later. Before the statute, a Special De-
murrer was seldom used except for duplicity; after the statute the
Special Demurrer reached both defects in form and defects in sub-
stance. In effect, then, after the statute, the Special Demurrer per-
formed substantially the same function as did the General Demurrer
prior to the statute, whereas the General Demurrer, after the statute,
unlike before, was limited to defects in substance.
In the second place, it should be observed that under a Special
Demurrer the party may, upon the argument, not only take advan-
tage of the particular faults which his Demurrer specifies, but also all
such objections in substance as are not required by the statute to be
particularly set down, as "every Special Demurrer includes a General
one,"M e that is, since a Special Demurrer is a General Demurrer, with a
specification of some defect in form set down and "expressed together
with the Demurrer." What Demurrer? The General Demurrer, as pro-
vided for by the express language of the statute. The Special Demur-
rer, therefore, in its expanded scope, after 1585, was a direct product
of the Statute of Elizabeth. It, therefore, follows that unless the objec-
tion be clearly one of substance, the safest course for the pleader to
follow is to Demur specially in all casesI 7 Some lawyers, however, be-
76 Walden v. Holden, 2 Ld. Raym. 1015, 92 Eng. Rep. 175 (1703).
"T Maine: State v. Peck, 60 Me. 498 (1872); New York: Burnett v. Bisco, 4 Johns.
I(N. Y.) 23S (1809). See, also, New Jersey: State v. Covenhoven, 6 X. J. L. 396, 401
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cause of their high ethical standards, refuse to take advantage of a
defect in form, hence seldom use any form of Demurrer but
the General. When a General Demurrer is plainly sufficient, there-
fore, it is usually adopted in practice. When it is desired to take
advantage of a defect in form the Special Demurrer must be used and
the adverse party must be apprised of the objection relied on and he
is thereby enabled to avoid it by amendment, or meet it fully on
argument.
7 8
In the third place, the statute had no application to pleas in abate-
ment as the statute provided that judgment, upon Demurrer, should
be given according to the merits. The common-law rule that a Gen-
eral Demurrer would reach a defect in any plea, in abatement or in
bar, therefore, remained the same. This restriction of the effect of
the statute reflects the general feeling that pleas in abatement, de-
signed to defeat the action on grounds foreign to justice, were odious
in the law and hence were construed strictly.
9
In the fourth place, the Statute of Elizabeth failed to define what
constituted a defect in form and a defect in substance, the line be-
tween which it is difficult to draw. In this connectibn Professor
Austin Scott aptly observes: "It has some times been said that sub-
stance has to do with the matter pleaded, and that form has to do
with the manner of pleading. This statement is not very helpful,
however, for the distinction is, in the last analysis, one of degree rather
than of kind. A pleading, for example, may be somewhat too indefi-
(1797) in which KiNSEY, J., declared: "Another observation may here be made, in answer
to what was dropped by one of the counsel, on the argument. It was said, that on a
special demurrer, no objection can be taken which is not particularly specified in the
demurrer, and, therefore, that the prosecution is precluded from urging some of the
objections which have been made. The observation, so far as it relates to formal de-
fects, is correct, and warranted by the statute, but defects of substance may be taken
advantage of at any time."
78 1 ARCHBALD, NsI Pa-us, 313 (3d Am. ed. by Findlay, Philadelphia 1853); Clue
v. Bailey, 1 Vent. 240, 86 Eng. Rep. 161 (1674).
79 As to General Demurrer, see: English: Cole v. Maunder, 2 ROLLE, ABRIDGMENT,
548 (London 1668); Hodges v. Stewart, 3 Salk. 68, 91 Eng. Rep. 696 (1795); Tresham
v. Ford, Cro. Eliz. 830, 78 Eng. Rep. 1057 (1706); Georgia: Lampkin v. Williams,
89 Ga. 388, 15 S. E. 487 (1897); Texas: George v. Thomas, 16 Tex. 74, 67 Am. Dec.
612 (1856).
The Demurrer in code and equity pleading is always Special, pointing out the
objectionable features relied upon.
As some states have abolished the use of Special Demurrers, there would seem then
to be no method of objection when a General Demurrer could not properly be used.
Chandler v. Byrd, Hempst. 222, Fed. Cas. No. 2,591b (1833). And in those states what
are called "General" Demurrers are "Special" also, in that they must specify the points
of objections. State of Maine v. Peck, 60 Me. 498 (1872).
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nite, and so bad in form;8" or it may be so very indefinite as to fail
to state a cause of action or defense, and hence be bad in substance."'"
(C) Doubts as to Construction of Statute.-As a result of the
failure of the statute to distinguish between form and substance,
doubts arose as to its contruction, and in addition it met with resist-
ance from some of the more conservative common-law judges when
it came to the matter of its application. They questioned whether"certain defects which, under a liberal construction of the statute, might
be deemed formal, should not be held to be substantial. Thus, for
example, in the case of Willis v. Neilder, decided in 1620,2 where the
plaintiff brought trespass for taking three loads of wheat, being sev-
ered for tithes, contra pacem, but omitting the companion phrase, vi
et armis, on motion in arrest of judgment, which is but a delayed De-
murrer, the court held that such a phrase was clearly an essential
part of the declaration which induceth to have a fine for the King;
and that such defect was not aided by the statute, although certainly,
according to the spirit and intendment of the statute, it was just this
sort of defect which its framers sought to have aided upon a General
Demurrer.
Because of this specific defect and others of a similar character,
80 Central R. R. Co. v. Vauhan, 38 N. J. L. 133 (1875).
But, HOBART, C. J., in referring to the Statute of Demurrers, 27 Eliz. c. 5, § 1
(1585) and to the distinction between form and substance, in the case of Heard v.
Baskerville, Hob. 232, 80 Eng. Rep. 378 (1614), decided twenty-nine years after the
statute, observed: "Now the moderation of this statute is such that it doth not utterly
reject form, for that were a dishonour to the law, and make it in effect no art; but
requires that it be discovered and not used as a secret snare to entrap. And that dis-
covery must not be confused and obscure, but special."
CHirnr, in Volume 1 of his TREATIsE ON Th FoRmas or ACTiON AND ON PLPAmNo,
c. IX, Demurrers, 459 (3d Am. ed. from the 2nd London ed. by Dunlop, Philadel-
phia 1819), rephrased the same idea in the following language: "For, as observed by
Lord Hobart, 'The Statute of Elizabeth, requiring a special demurrer, does not utterly
reject form, for that would be destructive of the law, as a science, but it only requires
that the defect in form be discovered, and not used as a secret snare to entrap.'"
And, again, referring to form, in Morgan v. Sargent, 1 Bos. & Pul. 59, 126 Eng.
Rep. 777 (1797), Cn JusncF ERE declared that "infinite mischief has been pro-
duced by the facility of the courts in overlooking errors in form; it encourages care-
lessness, and places ignorance too much upon a footing with knowledge amongst those
who practice the drawing of pleadings."
But Professor Scott, by what may be regarded in reply, though at a much later
date, aptly remarks: "The fear of dishonoring the law of pleading by making it no
art, has led to the retention of many a rule preventing the determination of causes
upon their merits, and serving no useful purpose other than to give to the.law of
pleading the appearance of artistic symmetry." FUNDAmENTALS OF PaOCEDURE 3N Ac-
TiONS AT LAW, c. V. Amendments and Jeojails, 145 (New York 1922).
81 Moore v. Hobbs, 79 N. C. 535 (1878).
82 Cro. Jac. 526, 79 Eng. Rep. 450 (1620).
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and in order to realize upon the other objections which fell within
the spirit of the Statute of Elizabeth, in 1705, or one hundred and
twenty years after the enactment of the original statute in 1585, it
was amended by the Statute of Anne,83 which appears below:
STATUTE OF ANNE (1705)84
(c. 16, § 1, 11 Statutes at Large, 135)
FoR the amendment of the law in several particulars, and for
the easier, speedier, and better advancement of justice, be it enacted
... That from and after the first day of Trinity term, which shall be
in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and six, where
any demurrer shall be joined, and entered in any action or suit in any
court of record within this realm, the judges shall proceed and give
judgment, according as the very right of the cause and matter in law
shall appear unto them, without regarding any imperfection, omission
or defect in any writ, return, plaint, declaration, or other pleading,
process, or course of proceeding whatsoever, except those only which
the party demurring shall specially and particularly set down and ex-
press, together with his demurrer, as causes of the same, notwithstand-
ing that such imperfection, omission, or defect might have heretofore
been taken to be a matter of substance, and not aided by the statute
made in the twenty-seventh year of Queen Elizabeth, intituled, "An
Act for the furtherance of justice in case of demurrer and pleadings,"
so as sufficient matter appear in the said pleadings, upon which the
court may give judgment according to the very right of the cause;
and therefore from and after the said first day of Trinity term, no
advantage or exception shall be taken of or for an immaterial traverse;
or of or for the default of entering pledges upon any bill or declara-
tion; or of or for the default of alleging the.bringing into court any
bond, bill, indenture, or other deed whatsoever mentioned in the
declaration or other pleading; or of or for the default of alleging of
the bringing into court letters testamentary, or letters of administra-
tion; or of or for the omission of Vi et Armis et contra pacem, or either
of them; or of or for the want of averment of Hoc Paratus est verifi-
care, or Hoc Paratus est verificare per Recordum; or of or for not
alleging prout pater per Recordum, but the court shall give judgment
according to the very right of the cause, as aforesaid, without regard-
ing any such imperfections, omissions, and defects, or any other mat-
83 C. 16, § 1, 11 Statutes at Large 135.
84 "The twelfth section of the [New Jersey] statute on amendments and jeo-
fails is a substantial copy of the first section of the (English] act of 4 Anne, c. 16
[§ 1], and was introduced in our legislation in 1794. Pct. L., p. 126." New York Trap
Rock Co. v. Brown & Fleming, 61 N. J. L. 536, 43 AtI. 100 (1898).
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ter of like nature, except the same shall be specially and particularly
set down and shown for cause of Demurrer.85
VIII. KINDS AND FORMS OF DEMURRER AFTER 1705
THE kinds and forms of Demurrers after 1705 remained sub-
stantially the same, except for a slight alteration in the scope of the
Special Demurrer. The Statute of Anne (1705), as above set forth,
was merely a reenactment of the Statute of Elizabeth (1585) almost
word for word, with a proviso that "sufficient matter appear in the
said pleadings, upon which the court may give judgment according
to the very right of the cause,"8 6 plus an enumeration of certain de-
fects, which upon the construction of the prior statute, had been
held to be substantial, but which were now to be held formal,
and hence aided upon Special Demurrer, the conservative views
of the judges to the contrary notwithstanding. As Gould 7 has so
accurately stated, the Statute of Anne (1705) was enacted "partly in
extension of the healing operation of the former act-and also ex-
pressly specifying a variety of particular defects, which, though be-
fore deemed substantial-are, by this latter act, virtually converted
into matters of form and thus aided on General Demurrer. The Stat-
ute of Elizabeth then, requires Demurrers to be special, for formal de-
fects, in general; and that by Anne, after reenacting the same general
provision, extends, or applies it to certain particular defects, express-
ly named in the act."8
(To Be Continued)
85 The italics are the author's.
Both the Statute of 27 Eliz. c. 5, § 1 (1585) and the Statute of 4 Anne c. 16,
§ 1 (1705) have been adopted in some states. Curiously enough, as in New Jersey,
and in New York, the two have been combined into a single statute. 1 N. J. Comp.
St. 46, § 12 (1937).
86 See the proviso in the statute set forth above.
87 GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE PRmCIPLES OF PLEADiNG, Pt. III, c. 5, Of Demurrer,
576, 577 (6th ed. by Will, Albany 1909).
The Statute of Elizabeth, 27 Eliz. c. 5, § 1 (1585) and the Statute of 4 Anne,
c. 16, § 4 (1705) are applicable only in civil actions, being confined to proceedings
to an "action or suit." The former statute is, by express proviso, not extended to
criminal proceedings. In indictments, therefore, formal defects are still available on
General Demurrer as at common law. A proviso in the Statute of Anne barred its ex-
tension to actions on penal statutes, which are civil suits. But this proviso, in the year
1731 was repealed by the Statute of 4 Geo. 11, c. 26, § 4.
88 "The defects specifically enumerated, and cured by the latter statute, are
immaterial traverses-the omission of Profert of deeds, &c.-or of the words vi et armis,
and contra pacem--or of a verification per recordum-or of a prout patet per re-
cordum. All these defects are therefore aided by this statute on demurrers, unless spe-
cially assigned for cause of demurrer." GouLD, A TREATIsE oN T PRmCIPLES Or
PiEADING, Pt. III, c. 5, Of Demurrers, 577 (6th ed. by Will, Albany 1909).
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